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ARGUMENTS 
I. BECAUSE MR. ALBERT AGREES WITH THE PREMISE THAT 
ORDERS DEALING WITH §34A-2-413 ARE NOT FINAL APPEALABLE 
ORDERS UNTIL AFTER ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF § 413 HAVE 
BEEN MET, THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND THIS CASE TO THE 
LABOR COMMISSION FOR A SECOND-STEP PROCEEDING 
CONSISTENT WITH § 413 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 specifically mandates that an order of the Labor 
Commission is not final until notice of a second-step proceeding is sent to the parties involved 
and the parties have an opportunity to submit a rehabilitation plan at a rehabilitation hearing 
conducted by the Commission. Mr. Johnny Albert (hereinafter "Mr. Albert") agrees that the 
plain language of the statute provides that an order of permanent total disability is not final until 
the second step proceeding occurs or the parties waive their right to the proceeding. See, Mr. 
Albert's Appellee Brief, Page 5. Based upon this recognition of the plain language of the statute, 
Mr. Albert does not dispute the fact the plain language of the statute is explicit and, therefore, the 
Court of Appeals erred when it attempted to harmonize the statute with the Labor Commission 
rule. 
Specifically, Mr. Albert argues that this Court should strike the administrative rule that 
provides that a tentative finding of permanent total disability is a final agency action for purposes 
of review. See, Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief, Page 6, Note 2. Mr. Albert explicitly provides that 
"[t]he Rule [Utah Admin. Code R612-l-10.C.l(c)] must yield to the statute, and this Court 
should strike this Rule." Id. In essence, Mr. Albert is arguing the same points that Ameritemps 
argued in its Appellants' Brief - that the Court of Appeals erred in synthesizing the 
administrative rule with the statute and the plain language of the statute should be enforced in 
this case. 
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Mr. Albert attempts to argue that Ameritemps stipulated to a final order of disability 
and/or waived its rights to a second step proceeding. This argument is without merit and is not 
properly before this Court as Mr. Albert failed to challenge the Court of Appeals' ruling on 
whether Ameritemps stipulated to a final order of permanent total disability. See, Ameritemps, 
Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491, f 13, 128 P.3d 31. Ameritemps hereby adopts the 
arguments made in its Motion to Strike Portions of Johnny Albert's Appellee Brief, attached to 
the Appendix hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this reference. 
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Ameritemps did not stipulate to a final 
order of permanent total disability, nor did it waive its rights to a second step rehabilitation 
proceeding. Ameritemps, 2005 UT App 491, f 13. Mr. Albert did not appeal this finding by the 
Court of Appeals and, therefore, the Court of Appeals ruling regarding the same stands as the 
issue is not properly before this Court for determination. 
Moreover, this Court has provided that the only issue properly before it for review is 
"[w]hether an initial finding of permanent total disability under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 
constitutes a final agency action for purposes of appellate review." See, Order dated March 29, 
2006 (hereinafter the "Order"), attached to the Appendix hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated 
herein by this reference. As the issue of whether a stipulation did or did not occur is outside the 
scope of the issue certified for review by this Court, the issue is moot as it is not properly before 
this Court. 
Regardless, Mr. Albert concedes in his briefing that Utah Administrative Rule R612-1-
10.C.l(c) was improperly utilized by the Utah Court of Appeals and should be stricken from the 
Rules. See, Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief, Page 6. As a result of this concession, Mr. Albert is in 
agreement with Ameritemps' argument that the Court of Appeals decision should be overturned 
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for improperly synthesizing the Rule with the statute. The result of overturning the Court of 
Appeals decision and upholding the plain language of § 34A-2-413 is to remand this case for a 
second-step rehabilitation proceeding consistent with the statute. 
REPLY TO AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
II. UNION PACIFIC IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE 
INSTANT CASE BECAUSE §34a-2-413 ITSELF DETAILS WHEN A 
FINAL AGENCY ACTION FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL HAS 
OCCURRED, THEREBY OBVIATING THE NEED FOR THE UNION 
PACIFIC ANALYSIS 
American Asbestos Abatement and the Workers' Compensation Fund (hereinafter 
"AAA") approves of the Utah Court of Appeals analysis and would have this Court apply the 
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17, test 
despite the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413. The need for the Union Pacific test, 
however, was developed as a result of a question as to what decisions in the various 
administrative agencies were appealable so as to start the time for the appeal running. In this 
case, the statute itself determines when an order of permanent total disability is final and when it 
is tentative, thereby obviating the need for the Union Pacific Test. 
As previously stated, this Court already has ruled that it "will interpret a statute according 
to its plain meaning and seek to effectuate the intent of the legislature." Machock v. Fink, 2006 
UT 30, f 16, - P.3d - (citing, State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 17, f 11, - P.3d --). The plain language 
of § 413 (6)(a) makes clear that an order of permanent total disability is not final until notice of a 
second step is provided, the employer provides a rehabilitation plan or waives said plan, and the 
administrative law judge holds a hearing on said rehabilitation plan. 
By utilizing the Union Pacific test in the instant case would only add confusion and 
muddy the water on what has previously been considered a fairly straight-forward statute. By 
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utilizing the Union Pacific Test, this Court would add another layer of unnecessary procedure 
when the statute itself explicitly mandates when a final agency action for purposes of appeal has 
occurred with respect to permanent total disability cases. As a result, Ameritemps requests this 
Court interpret the plain language of the statute as the statute unambiguously provides that a final 
agency action for purposes of permanent total disability has not occurred until the Labor 
Commission has provided the opportunity for a second-step rehabilitation hearing. As this was 
not done in this case, the plain language of the statute should be followed and a second-step 
rehabilitation hearing should be awarded so as to comply with the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Ameritemps respectfully requests this Court remand this case 
to the Labor Commission for proceedings consistent with the plain language of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-413(6) as the Labor Commission's Order was not a final appealable order. 
DATED THIS ^ day of August, 2006. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
n na.. -rfO^Clo 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA 
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an addendum is 
included herewith. 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
AMERITEMPS, INC. and/or HARTFORD 
INSURANCE, 
Respondents/Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION; and 
JOHNNY ALBERT, 
Petitioners/Appellees. 
1— 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF 
JOHNNY ALBERT'S APPELLEE BRIEF 
Supreme Court Case No.: 20051119 
Appellate Case No.: 20040953-CA 
Agency Case Nos.: 991213,20011073 
COMES NOW the Appellants, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Insurance (hereinafter 
"Ameritemps"), by and through their counsel of record, and hereby files this Motion to Strike 
Portions of Johnny Albert's Appellee's Brief pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
The purpose of this brief is to enforce the Utah Supreme Court's Order providing the 
scope of this appeal. Ameritemps has complied with the singular issue certified by this Supreme 
Court for review. Mr. Jolinny Albert (hereinafter "Mr. Albert") not only addressed the singular 
issue certified for by the Supreme Court, but also included numerous arguments he raised before 
the Court of Appeals. Mr. Albert's other arguments have exceeded the scope of this Court's 
grant of review and, therefore, should be stricken from the record. 
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Based upon the foregoing, Anieritemps respectfully requests the Supreme Court strike 
portions of Mr. Albert's Appellee's Brief that exceed the scope of the issue certified for review 
before the Supreme Court. 
DATED THIS *? day of August, 2006. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
cy. .je 0.. (1/2!. 
TJg*0DORB E. KANELL 
JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served, postage prepaid, via first class mail on the following: 
Richard Burke, Esq. 
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP 
7390 South Creek Road, Suite 104 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
Attorney for Respondent Johnny Albert 
Allen L. Hennebold, Esq. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Post Office Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Attorney for Respondent Labor Commission 
Floyd Holm, Esq. 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorney for American Asbestos Abatement and 
Workers' Compensation Fund 
James R. Black, Esq. 
Black & Ingleby 
265 East 100 South, Suite 255 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for American Asbestos Abatement and 
Workers' Compensation Fund 
^ ( ^ (2(2. 
2 
THEODORE E. KANELL (1768) 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
AMERITEMPS, INC. and/or HARTFORD 
INSURANCE, 
Respondents/Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION; and 
JOHNNY ALBERT, 
Petitioners/Appellees. 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF 
JOHNNY ALBERT'S APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
Supreme Court Case No.: 20051119 
Appellate Case No.: 20040953-CA 
Agency Case Nos.: 991213,20011073 
COMES NOW the Appellants, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Insurance (hereinafter 
"Ameritemps"), by and through their counsel of record, and hereby files this Motion to Strike 
Portions of Johnny Albert's Appellee's Brief pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ameritemps requests that portions of Mr. Johnny Albert's (hereinafter "Mr. Albert") 
Appellee Brief be stricken from the record for exceeding the scope of the issues certified for 
review before the Utah Supreme Court. Not only did Mr. Albert file his Appellee Brief a day 
after the stipulated date for filing his brief had passed, but also Mr. Albert exceeded the scope of 
this Court's grant of review. Mr. Albert not only addressed the singular issue certified for review 
by the Supreme Court, but also included numerous arguments he raised before the Court of 
Appeals. Mr. Albert's other arguments have exceeded the scope of this Court's grant of review 
and, therefore, should be stricken from the record. Mr. Albert did not file a cross petition for a 
writ of certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court and, therefore, Mr. Albert is limited in his 
arguments to the issue certified by Utah Supreme Court and can no longer restate or reargue 
issues that he did not appeal from the Utah Court of Appeals decision. 
As a result of failing to file his own petition for writ of certiorari challenging other 
rulings made by the Utah Court of Appeals, Mr. Albert is precluded from otherwise challenging 
said rulings and findings made by the Court of Appeals. As the Utah Supreme Court only 
allowed a very narrow issue to be briefed on review, the Utah Supreme Court's order on the writ 
of certiorari should be enforced and portions of Mr. Albert's brief that exceed the scope of the 
issue on review should be stricken from the record. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On November 10, 2005, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision in the underlying 
appeal. See, Ameritemps v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 491, 138 P.3d 31, attached hereto 
as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this reference. 
2. Due to the Tenth falling on a weekend, Ameritemps filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
on December 12, 2005. See, Ameritemps'Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
3. On March 29, 2005, the Utah Supreme Court filed its Order granting Ameritemps' 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. See, Order dated March 29, 2006 (hereinafter the "Order"), 
attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by this reference. 
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4. In its Order, the Utah Supreme Court identified the sole issue to be addressed on review: 
"Whether an initial finding of permanent total disability under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 
constitutes a final agency action for purposes of appellate review." See, The Order, Exhibit B. 
5. Mr. Albert did not file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari and did not otherwise challenge 
the Court of Appeals' findings and conclusions. See, Court Docket. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. PORTIONS OF MR. ALBERT'S APPELLEE BRIEF SHOULD BE 
STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD AS THOSE PORTIONS CONTAIN 
ARGUMENTS THAT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF THIS COURT'S ORDER 
GRANTING AMERITEMPS' PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
This Court granted Ameritemps' Petition for Writ of Certiorari on a singular issue 
pertaining to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 and what is considered a final order for purposes of 
Appellate Review. Specifically, this Court provided in its Order granting the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari that "...the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted only as to the following issue: 
Whether an initial finding of permanent total disability under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 
constitutes a final agency action for purposes of appellate review." The Order, Exhibit B. 
Ostensibly, anything that does not address the only issue presently before the Utah Supreme 
Court should be stricken for exceeding the scope of the language in the Order. Anything that 
exceeds the scope of the order should be stricken as not properly before this Court on review. 
Because the record is devoid of any Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Mr. Albert 
with respect to the Utah Court of Appeals' ruling below, the only issue properly before the Utah 
Supreme Court is the singular question noted above. More importantly, the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure (hereinafter "URAP") provide that "[u]nless otherwise provided by law, the 
review of a judgment, an order, and a decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Utah Court 
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of Appeals shall be initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court." 
URAPRule45. 
Mr. Albert's failure to file for a writ of certiorari within the period set forth in URAP 
Rule 48 (30 days) now precludes Mr. Albert from re-arguing the points he presented before the 
Utah Court of Appeals. As further provided for in the rules, the petition for writ of certiorari is 
important as the "only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be 
considered by the Supreme Court." URAP Rule 49(a)(4). It was within Mr. Albert's ability to 
file a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals decision, but Mr. Albert 
failed to file said petition and now is precluded from re-arguing or otherwise challenging the 
findings and conclusions of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
A review of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief illustrates that Mr. Albert is attempting to 
challenge certain findings and conclusions made by the Court of Appeals. Because Mr. Albert 
has exceeded the scope of the narrow question of law certified for review by this Court, portions 
of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be stricken as exceeding the scope of the issue being 
considered by this Court. 
Specifically, in sections 1-A through 1-E of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief he reiterates his 
arguments proffered to the Utah Court of Appeals thereby attempting to expand the scope of the 
issue before the Utah Supreme Court. Section 1-A discusses jurisdiction of this Court to hear the 
appeal currently pending before this Court. Mr. Albert admits the Labor Commission did not 
schedule a second step hearing, but argues that it did not do so because the Labor Commission 
considered Mr. Albert unemployable. See, Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief, Page 1. No such finding 
was ever made by the Labor Commission, nor by the Court of Appeals and, therefore, Section 1-
A of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be stricken from the record on appeal. 
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Section 1-B of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be stricken from the record on appeal 
as Mr. Albert failed to file a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court challenging the Court 
of Appeals' ruling on whether Ameritemps waived its rights to a second step proceeding. The 
Court of Appeals specifically found that Ameritemps did not waive its rights to a second step 
proceeding as alleged by Mr. Albert. See, Ameritemps v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 
491, \ 13, 138 P.3d 31, Exhibit A. Mr. Albert failed to file a petition for writ of certiorari 
challenging this finding by the Court of Appeals and, therefore, Mr. Albert's arguments against 
this finding should be stricken from the record as it exceeds the scope of the singular issue 
currently before this Court. As a result, Section 1-B of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be 
stricken from the record on appeal. 
Similarly, Section 1~C in Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be stricken from the record 
as it does not address the issue certified for review by this Court and re-argues issues Mr. Albert 
presented to the Court of Appeals but did not appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. As Mr. Albert 
did not appeal the merits of Ameritemps' appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals and did not file its 
own cross-petition for writ of certiorari, Mr. Albert's arguments should be limited to the singular 
argument certified by this Court for review. Consequently, Section 1-C should be stricken from 
the record. 
As with Section 1-B, above, Section 1-D of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be 
stricken as Mr. Albert did not appeal the finding of the Court of Appeals with respect to the 
Court's analysis regarding the stipulation. See, Ameritemps v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT 
App 491, If 13, 138 P.3d 31, Exhibit A. Mr. Albert's failure to file a cross-petition for writ of 
certiorari cannot be remedied at this late date by including arguments that he should have 
appealed to this Court. 
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Given the strict rules regarding certification of questions to the Supreme Court as 
provided in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Mr. Albert's failure to comply with said 
rules and properly challenge the Court of Appeals' ruling on the issue of the stipulation is 
precluded as outside of the scope of the issue certified for review by this Court. If Mr. Albert 
felt strongly that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis on the stipulation at the hearing, Mr. 
Albert should have filed his own petition for writ of certiorari and challenged said findings by 
the Court of Appeals. 
To argue the case now, however, impermissibly exceeds the scope of the issue certified 
for review by this Court. As Mr. Albert's arguments in Section 1-D in his Appellee Brief 
exceeds the scope of the issue certified for review it should be stricken from the record on 
appeal. 
Finally, for the reasons detailed in Section 1-D, above, Section 1-E should be stricken 
from the record on appeal as Mr. Albert again challenges the Court of Appeals' analysis 
regarding its analysis on the finality of the underlying tentative finding of permanent total 
disability. For the reasons asserted in opposition to Section 1-D, above, Ameritemps requests 
this Court strike Section 1-E of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief for exceeding the scope of the issue 
certified for review by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Ameritemps respectfully requests this Court strike Sections 1-
A through 1-E of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief. Not only was Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief filed 
after the cutoff date for filing his Appellee Brief, but also the issues raised in his Appellee Brief 
exceed the scope of the singular issue certified for review by this Court. The arguments 
exceeding the scope of the issue on review should be stricken from the record on appeal. 
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DATED THIS "^ day of August, 2006. 
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JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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EXHIBIT A 
Page 1 
LEXSEE 2005 UTAPP 491 
Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Insurance, Petitioners, v. Labor Commission, 
Workers' Compensation Fund, American Asbestos Abatement, and Johnny Albert, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20040953-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2005 UTApp 491; 128 R3d 31; 538 Utah Adv. Rep. 55; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 
469 
November 10, 2005, Filed 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Writ of certiorari granted 
Ameritemps v. Lbr Cmmn, 2006 Utah LEXIS 63 (Utah, 
Mar. 30, 2006) 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed. 
COUNSEL: Theodore E. Kanell and Joseph C. 
Alamilla, Salt Lake City, for Petitioners. 
Richard R. Burke, James R. Black, Alan L. Hennebold, 
and Floyd W. Holm, Salt Lake City, for Respondents. 
JUDGES: Before Judges McHugh, Orme, and Thome. 
OPINIONBY: Carolyn B. McHugh 
OPINION: [**34] Original Proceeding in this Court 
McHUGH, Judge: 
f***l] [*P1] Ameritemps, Inc. (Ameritemps) and 
Hartford Insurance (collectively, Petitioners) seek judi-
cial review of the Utah Labor Commission (Commis-
sion) Appeals Board's (Board) denial of their motion for 
review of a decision of a Commission Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) awarding Johnny Albert permanent 
total disability compensation benefits. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-413 (Supp. 2005). nl We affirm. 
nl We recognize that "in workers' compensa-
tion claims, the law existing at the time of the in-
jury applies in relation to that injury." Brown & 
Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n, 947 P.2d 
671, 675 (Utah 1997). Because the relevant por-
tions of the current version of this statute, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (Supp. 2005), are 
substantively identical to the relevant portions of 
the version in effect at the time of Albert's injury, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (Supp. 1995), we 
cite to the most current version throughout this 
opinion as a convenience to the reader. 
j***2] 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] Over the span of approximately seven years, 
Albert was injured in a number of industrial accidents 
that occurred while he was working for various employ-
ers. With the exception of his final accident, Albert re-
turned to work after each incident, despite having suf-
fered some level of whole person impairment. In his final 
industrial accident, which occurred on June 16, 1997, 
while he was working for Ameritemps, Albert severely 
injured his left foot. Although he had four separate sur-
geries to correct the problems that resulted from this in-
jury, Albert never returned to work. 
[*P3] Thereafter, Albert filed a claim with the 
Commission against Ameritemps for, among other 
things, permanent total disability compensation benefits. 
On December 17, 2002, a hearing was held before the 
ALJ, which addressed numerous claims Albert had filed 
with the Commission, including his claims against 
Ameritemps. Albert's other claims were for disability 
benefits arising out of industrial accidents that occurred 
while he was working for employers other than Amer-
itemps. On July 22, 2003, the ALJ issued a decision re-
garding Albert's claims. 
[*P4] As an initial matter, the ALJ [***3] noted in 
the decision that all of the parties opposing Albert's 
claims, including Ameritemps, had "conceded that [he] 
was permanently and [**35] totally disabled," but that 
each party "alleged that an injury other than the one re-
spectively defended by [each party] directly caused [Al-
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bert]'s permanent and total disability." The ALJ found, 
based upon a medical evaluation contained in the record, 
that the left foot injury Albert had suffered while work-
ing for Ameritemps "caused him a 4% whole person im-
pairment." The ALJ also found that 
the preponderance of the evidence in this 
case revealed that despite the legion of 
medical and psychological impairments 
accumulated by [Albert] during the course 
of his life, he remained able to work until 
the injury he sustained on June 16, 1997[,] 
with Ameritemps. [His left foot injury] on 
June 16, 1997, with the subsequent four 
surgeries and 4% whole person permanent 
impairment, proved to be the proverbial 
straw that broke the camel's back. [Albert] 
never returned to work after the June 16, 
1997 industrial accident, and thereafter by 
consensus remained permanently and to-
tally disabled. 
[*P5] Based upon these findings, the [***4] appli-
cable statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (Supp. 
2005), and the odd-lot doctrine, see, e.g., Peck v. Eimco 
Process Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572, 574-75 (Utah 1987); 
Zupon v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 960, 963-64 
(Utah Ct. App. J993), the ALJ concluded that Albert was 
permanently totally disabled and that the June 16, 1997 
industrial accident, which occurred while Albert was 
employed by Ameritemps, "directly caused his perma-
nent total disability." Accordingly, the ALJ entered an 
award of permanent total disability compensation bene-
fits in favor of Albert and against Petitioners. 
[*P6] On August 21, 2003, Petitioners filed a mo-
tion for review with the Board. On May 2, 2004, the 
Board issued an order denying Petitioners' motion, af-
firming and adopting the ALJ's factual findings, and af-
firming the ALJ's decision as it applied to Petitioners. 
Petitioners now seek judicial review of that order. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[*P7] Petitioners argue that this court does not 
have subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board's 
order. A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction presents 
a question [***5] of law, which we review for correct-
ness. See Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT81, P8, 
31 P.3d 1147. 
[*P8] Petitioners also argue that there is evidence 
in the record that precludes an award of permanent total 
disability compensation benefits to Albert and, as such, 
the Board incorrectly applied the law to the facts in this 
case. When reviewing the Board's decision, we will dis-
turb its factual findings only if they are "not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(g) (2004). Further, "when an agency has discretion 
to apply its factual findings to the law, we will not dis-
turb the agency's application unless its determination 
exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." 
Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (quotations and citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
[*P9] Before arguing their challenge to the Board's 
substantive decision, Petitioners argue that there has 
been no final agency action creating subject matter juris-
diction in this court because the ALJ and the Board did 
not complete the two-step [***6] process set forth under 
the Workers' Compensation Act for establishing perma-
nent total disability. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 
(Supp. 2005). In response, the Commission, Albert, 
American Asbestos Abatement, and Workers' Compen-
sation Fund (collectively, Respondents) assert that Peti-
tioners failed to preserve this issue for appeal and waived 
any argument that Albert is not permanently totally dis-
abled. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 
I. Preservation and Waiver 
[*P10] Petitioners concede that they did not raise 
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction prior to their brief 
with this court. Notwithstanding that admission, we may 
consider it: "Questions regarding subject matter jurisdic-
tion may be raised at any time because such issues de-
termine whether a court has authority to address the mer-
its of [**36] a particular case." Housing Auth. v. Sny-
der, 2002 UT28, Pll, 44 P.3d 724. In addition, because 
subject matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite to this court's 
power to consider the substantive issues, the requirement 
that the court have proper jurisdiction over the subject of 
the dispute cannot be waived. See, e.g., [***7] Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, P34, 100 P.3d 1177; Barnard v. 
Wassermann, 855 P. 2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993). Issues 
relating to subject matter jurisdiction are threshold ques-
tions that should be addressed before resolving other 
claims. See Snyder, 2002 UT 28 at Pll. Because we 
conclude that Petitioners' challenge to subject matter 
jurisdiction is properly before us, we consider it before 
addressing their challenge to the Board's substantive de-
cision. 
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
[*P11] The Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
grants jurisdiction to the appellate courts over "final 
agency actions." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l), (3)(a) 
(2004). Thus, the first issue for consideration is whether 
the Board's decision finding Albert permanently totally 
disabled is a "final agency action," id., over which this 
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court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction. To answer 
that question, we must examine the specific statutory 
provisions involved. 
[*P12] The procedure for establishing permanent 
total disability is set forth in the Workers' Compensation 
Act. See id. § 34A-2-413. Under that statutory [***8] 
scheme, the injured employee must first meet his or her 
burden of establishing permanent total disability and 
causation by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. § 
34A-2-413(I)(b). The Commission must then consider 
the evidence to determine whether the employee is per-
manently totally disabled and unable to perform reasona-
bly available work. See id. § 34A-2-413(I)(c). Before 
disability benefits can be awarded, however, the Com-
mission must follow a two-step process outlined in sec-
tion 34A-2-413. See id. § 34A-2-413(6). The Utah Su-
preme Court explained the procedure for awarding such 
benefits in Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 
UT12, 84 P.3d 120J, stating: 
Section 34A-2-413(6) outlines the process 
an administrative law judge must follow 
when determining whether an injured em-
ployee is entitled to permanent total dis-
ability compensation. This section re-
quires that a finding be issued in two 
parts—an initial finding and a final find-
ing. The initial finding of permanent total 
disability triggers a review period in 
which the employer or its insurance car-
rier may submit a reemployment plan. 
[See Utah Code Ann,] § 34A-2-
4l3(6)(a)(ii) [***9] , (d). This subsection 
specifically states that the initial "finding 
by the Commission of permanent total 
disability is not final, unless otherwise 
agreed to by the parties, until" the em-
ployer has the opportunity to submit a re-
employment plan, the administrative law 
judge reviews this reemployment plan and 
the reemployment activities undertaken 
pursuant to statute, and the administrative 
law judge holds a hearing. Id. § 34A-2-
413(6)(a). The intent of the reemployment 
plan is to determine whether the injured 
employee can be rehabilitated in order to 
reenter the workforce, and a final finding 
of permanent total disability is held in re-
serve until the possibilities of reemploy-
ment are either exhausted or abandoned. 
Only after all of these requirements have 
been met does the finding of permanent 
total disability become final. 
Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at P2L The Board's decision in this 
case was issued after the initial determination of total 
permanent disability, but before any opportunity for Peti-
tioners to submit a reemployment plan. Thus, by the ex-
press terms of the Workers' Compensation Act, the "find-
ing by the [Board] of permanent total disability is not 
[***10] final, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, 
until" after the employer is given an opportunity to sub-
mit a reemployment plan. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
4B(6)(a). 
[*P13] Respondents argue that the parties agreed 
that the initial determination of the Board was final as a 
result of a colloquy between the ALJ and counsel for 
Ameritemps. When the ALJ asked whether Ameritemps 
was challenging that Albert was permanently totally dis-
abled, counsel for Ameritemps responded: "I don't have 
any proof to the contrary. I'm not here to submit [**37] 
proof on that issue." We agree with the ALJ's deterrnina-
tion that Ameritemps conceded that Albert was perma-
nently totally disabled for purposes of the initial finding 
of disability and causation. There is nothing in the dis-
cussion between the ALJ and counsel for Ameritemps, 
however, that supports a finding that Ameritemps in-
tended to waive its right to submit a reemployment plan 
if the industrial accident that occurred while Albeit was 
employed by Ameritemps was found to be the direct 
cause of Albert's permanent total disability. Thus, if this 
court has subject matter jurisdiction, it must be based on 
a conclusion that the [***H] initial determination of 
permanent total disability is a final agency action. 
[*P14] From a cursory reading of the Workers' 
Compensation Act's pronouncement that the initial de-
termination is not final, it might appear that this court 
need inquire no further to conclude that the Board's order 
at issue is not a "final agency action," id. § 6 3-4 6b-
14(1), (3)(a), and that this court is without subject matter 
jurisdiction. The analysis of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Thomas, however, requires that we consider both 
whether the initial determination by the Board is a "final 
order" of that agency, and separately, whether it is a "fi-
nal agency action." See 2004 UT 12 at PI4. Although the 
terms are similar, they are different in their effect on this 
court's jurisdiction. 
[*P15] In Thomas, the Utah Supreme Court con-
sidered whether an initial determination of permanent 
total disability under section 34A-2-413 was a '"final 
order'" of the Commission for which an abstract of 
judgment could be issued allowing the employee to en-
force the temporary disability award in district court. Id. 
at PI I. After reviewing the language of section 34A-2-
413, the Thomas [***12] court concluded that "because 
initial findings are not final orders, subsistence payment 
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orders predicated upon initial findings are also not final 
orders." Id. at P25. In the absence of a final order from 
the Commission, no abstract was available. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-212(l)(a) (2001) ("An abstract of 
any final order providing an award may be filed . . . in 
the office of the clerk of the district court of any county 
in the state."). 
[*P16] In reaching its conclusion, the Thomas 
court distinguished between a '"final order"' of an agency 
that could support an abstract of judgment and a '"final 
agency action"' that can confer subject matter jurisdiction 
on the appellate courts. Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at PI4. 
Although the Utah Administrative Proce-
dures Act grants jurisdiction to the appel-
late courts over "final agency actions," it 
"does not specifically define" this term. 
Barker v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 970 
P.2d 702, 705 (Utah 1998). Since this act 
does not provide a definition, we devel-
oped the Union Pacific test to determine 
when administrative orders constitute "fi-
nal agency actions" [***13] in order to 
invoke appellate jurisdiction. [See Union 
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
2000 UT 40, PI6, 999 P.2d 17]. Unlike 
the term "final agency action," the term 
"final order" is defined in the Workers' 
Compensation Act. Because this act 
clearly defines "final order," we need not 
turn to Union Pacific for guidance on 
what constitutes a "final order" for which 
an abstract may issue. Thus, what consti-
tutes a final order for puiposes of appel-
late review is different than what consti-
tutes a final order for puiposes of the is-
suance of an abstract of an administrative 
award. 
Commission, 2005 UT App 70, 108 P. 3d 128 (mem.) (per 
curiam), [**38] may have confused these two concepts. 
In Target Trucking, we dismissed an appeal of a prelimi-
nary determination of permanent total disability for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the statutory 
language. See id. at P6\ see also Utah Code Ann. § 34 A-
2-413(6)(a) ("A finding by the Commission of perma-
nent total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed 
to by the parties . . . . " ) . In doing so, this court made no 
distinction between a "final order" and a "final agency 
action," and did not apply the Union Pacific three-part 
test to determine whether we should exercise appellate 
jurisdiction. See Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI6. In con-
sidering the issue now before this court, we apply that 
test to answer the initial question concerning this court's 
subject matter jurisdiction. "Although the Union Pacific 
test does not apply to determining what constitutes 
[***15] a 'final order' for which an abstract may issue 
under the Workers' Compensation Act, Union Pacific 
continues to be the standard by which 'final administra-
tive action' will be judged for the purpose of judicial re-
view." Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at PI5. 
[*P18] In Union Pacific, the Utah Supreme Court 
adopted the following three-part test to determine 
whether an agency action is final: 
(1) Has administrative decision making 
reached a stage where judicial review will 
not disrupt the orderly process of adjudi-
cation?; 
(2) Have rights or obligations been deter-
mined or will legal consequences flow 
from the agency action?; and 
(3) Is the agency action, in whole or in 
part, not preliminary, preparatory, proce-
dural, or intermediate with regard to sub-
sequent agency action? 
Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at P14. The Thomas court then 
determined that an initial finding of permanent total dis-
ability was not a "final order" as defined by the Workers' 
Compensation Act. See id. at P25. But, the Thomas court 
did not consider whether an initial decision of the Com-
mission finding permanent total disability is a "final 
agency action" that can confer subject matter jurisdiction 
on an appellate court for puiposes of judicial review. It 
merely indicated that the analysis of that question should 
be performed using the test announced [*** 14] in Union 
Pacific. See Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at PI5. 
[*P17] The recent per curiam decision from a di-
vided panel of this court in Target Trucking v. Labor 
Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI6. Agency actions that 
meet the foregoing test are appealable from the date of 
the order's issuance. See id. 
[*P19] Examining the Board's order under the 
three-part test set forth in Union Pacific, we conclude 
that the order is a final agency action. 
A. Orderly Process of Adjudication 
[*P20] This matter comes [***16] to this court af-
ter the Board's denial of Petitioners' motion for review of 
the ALJ's decision. "By denying reconsideration of its 
earlier findings and conclusions, the [Board] reached the 
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end of its decision making process" on the issue of per-
manent total disability. Id. at PI9. The Board's order 
denying Petitioners' motion for review includes a "Notice 
of Appeal Rights" section, which provides that a party 
may either (1) within twenty days of the date of the or-
der, request that the Board reconsider the order, or (2) 
within thirty days of the date of the order, petition this 
court for judicial review of the order. A request for re-
consideration was filed by a party that was involved in 
the proceedings before the Commission, but is not a 
party to this appeal. In the Board's order denying that 
request for reconsideration, the "Notice of Appeal 
Rights" section identified an appeal to this court as the 
only review available. n2 When the Board denied the 
request for reconsideration, that marked the end of its 
decision making process concerning the issue of perma-
nent total disability. 
Because of the nature of agency proceed-
ings, final actions often take place seria-
tim, disposing [***17] completely of dis-
crete issues in one order while leaving 
other issues for later orders. Such orders 
will be final as to any issue fully decided 
by that order and appealable any time 
from the date of that order to the last day 
to appeal the last final agency action in 
the case. 
Barker v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 970 P.2d 702, 706 
(Utah 1998). Although issues remained unresolved con-
cerning the possibility of reemployment, the question of 
whether Albert was permanently totally disabled was 
disposed of completely by the Board. Thus, "judicial 
review would not . . . interfere[] with the [Board]'s pro-
ceedings, since the [**39] [Board] had already refused 
to reconsider its prior order[]." Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 
at PI 9. 
n2 The Utah Supreme Court has indicated 
that "although omission of this language is not 
dispositive for our purposes on the question of 
whether an agency order is final, it certainly sig-
nals . . . that the [agency] believes it is." Union 
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 
UT40,P19n.6,999P.2d 17. 
[***18] 
B. Rights or Obligations Determined 
[*P21] In the decision from which Petitioners ap-
peal, the Board determined that Albert is permanently 
totally disabled and also awarded permanent total dis-
ability compensation payments to Albert to start immedi-
ately. Consequently, the second part of the Union Pacific 
test is met. See Barker, 970 P.2d at 706 (detemiining 
that agency action was final where "the language of the 
order makes clear that the [agency] determined obliga-
tions of the parties with which the parties must immedi-
ately comply"); see also Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at P20 
(concluding that the second prong of the three-part test 
was met where taxpayer's tax obligations were deter-
mined). 
C. Preliminary, Preparatory, Procedural, or Interme-
diate 
[*P22] The third step in detemiining whether 
agency action is final for puiposes of appeal is an analy-
sis of whether that action is, "in whole or in part, not 
preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate." 
Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI6. The Utah Supreme 
Court has provided examples of the types of proceedings 
that are not final under this last prong of the Union Pa-
cific [***19] analysis. 
The Utah cases on finality found no final 
order in the following circumstances: (1) 
a remand for further proceedings, Sloan v. 
Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463, 464 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); (2) an order con-
verting informal proceedings into formal 
ones, Merit Elec & Instrumentation v. 
Department of Commerce, 902 P.2d 151, 
153 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); and (3) a denial 
of a motion to dismiss, Barney v. Division 
of Occupational & Professional Licens-
ing, 828 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). These cases do not involve actions 
in the nature of a seriatim final order; they 
all involve preliminary, preparatory, pro-
cedural, or intermediate decisions. 
Barker, 970 P.2d at 706; see also Union Pac, 2000 UT 
40atP2J. 
[*P23] Although the Board's order leaves unre-
solved the issue of reemployment, it decides permanent 
total disability with finality. The order ended the decision 
making process at the agency level on this issue. Thus, 
the initial determination of permanent total disability was 
in the nature of a seriatim final order that was immedi-
ately appealable despite the fact that the [***20] agency 
still was required to conduct the second part of the sec-
tion 34A-2-413 analysis to determine whether Albert can 
be rehabilitated. n3 To the extent our decision in Target 
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Trucking v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 70, J08 
P. 3d 128 (mem.) (per curiam), holds otherwise, we dis-
avow it and instead follow the mandate of the Utah Su-
preme Court in Thomas v. Color Countiy Management, 
2004 UT 12, 84 P.3d 1201, to consider the issues of fi-
nality for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under the 
Union Pacific test, see 2000 UT 40 at PI 6. 
n3 This second step can be avoided if the 
parties agree that the finding of permanent total 
disability is final, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413(6)(a), or if the ALJ is provided with notice 
that the employer or its insurance earner will not 
submit a reemployment plan. See id. § 34A-2-
413(6)(a)(ii)(B). 
[*P24] This conclusion that the initial determina-
tion of permanent total disability [***21] is not a final 
order of the agency, but is a final agency action, also 
reconciles the statutory language with the applicable 
regulations. Section 34A-2-413(6)(a) expressly states that 
the initial determination is not final and, based on that 
language, the Utah Supreme Court held in Thomas that 
the initial determination is not a "final order" of the 
agency. See 2004 UT 12 at P25. In contrast, the Com-
mission's regulations state that "[a] preliminary determi-
nation of permanent total disability by the Labor Com-
missioner or [the] Board is a final agency action for pur-
poses of appellate judicial review." Utah Admin. Code 
R612-l-10(C)(l)(c). 
[*P25] Because the concepts of "final order" and 
"final agency action" are defined differently, the statute 
and the regulation can [**40] be reconciled. n4 An ini-
tial determination of permanent total disability is not a 
final order of the agency and, therefore, an abstract of 
judgment cannot be issued to enforce a pemianent total 
disability compensation award based on that preliminary 
finding. See Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at P25. In contrast, the 
preliminary determination of permanent total disability 
does conclude the [***22] agency decision making on 
the initial question of whether Albert is permanently to-
tally disabled. Thus, it is a seriatim final agency action, 
and this court does have subject matter jurisdiction to 
review it. 
n4 In Target Trucking v. Labor Commission, 
2005 UT App 70, P6, 108 P.3d 128 (mem.) (per 
curiam), this court concluded, without applying 
the Union Pacific test for finality, that the admin-
istrative rule was in conflict with the express 
statutory provisions. Because we hold that a pre-
liminary determination of pemianent total disabil-
ity is a final agency action, but not a final order 
of the agency, we now harmonize the rule and the 
statute. 
III. Substantive Review of Board's Order 
[*P26] Having concluded that we have subject 
matter jurisdiction to review the Board's order, we now 
turn to Petitioners' substantive challenge to that order. 
Petitioners argue that there is evidence in the record that 
precludes an award of permanent total disability com-
pensation benefits to Albert and, [***23] therefore, the 
Board incorrectly applied the law to the facts in this case. 
We disagree. 
[*P27] To advance their argument that there is evi-
dence in the record that precludes an award of permanent 
total disability compensation benefits, Petitioners selec-
tively recite the portions of the record evidence that sup-
port their position. Based on that selective recitation of 
the facts presented to the agency, Petitioners assert that 
the Board should have reached a different conclusion. 
This argument amounts to an indirect challenge to the 
Board's factual findings concerning the June 16, 1997 
industrial accident, and is an attempt by Petitioners to 
reargue the weight of the evidence in favor of their posi-
tion, which is a futile tactic on appeal. See Questar Pipe-
line Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 
(Utah 1993) ("When reviewing an agency's decision, [we 
do] not . . . reweigh the evidence."). Further, we will not 
disturb the Board's findings simply because another con-
clusion can be drawn from the evidence in the record. 
See Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) (stating that "findings will 'not be over-
turned [***24] if based on substantial evidence, even if 
another conclusion from the evidence is permissible'" 
(citation omitted)). Because Petitioners do not directly 
challenge any of the Board's factual findings concerning 
the June 16, 1997 industrial accident, we assume that 
they are supported by the record and do not disturb them. 
n5 See Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 312 
(Utah 1997) ("When a party fails to challenge a factual 
finding and marshal the evidence in support of that find-
ing, we 'assume[] that the record supports the finding[] . . 
. .'" (first alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
n5 Even if Petitioners had directly chal-
lenged the Board's factual findings concerning 
the June 16, 1997 industrial accident, that chal-
lenge would have failed because Petitioners 
failed to marshal the evidence in support of those 
findings in their opening brief. See Campbell v. 
Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) ("When a party fails to marshal the 
evidence supporting a challenged fact finding, we 
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reject the challenge as nothing more than an at-
tempt to reargue the case before [the appellate] 
court." (alteration in original) (quotations and ci-
tation omitted)). Moreover, after this failure was 
noted by Respondents in their briefs, Petitioners 
attempted to undertake the marshaling burden in 
their reply brief and, after doing so, admitted that 
there was evidence in the record that "could sup-
port" the Board's findings. Our review of the re-
cord indicates that the Board's findings are "sup-
ported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record." Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(4)(g) (2004). 
[***25] 
[*P28] Petitioners also argue that the Board misap-
plied the law to the facts of this case. More specifically, 
Petitioners argue that had the Board made different fac-
tual findings based upon the aforementioned evidence 
that supports their position, it would have reached a dif-
ferent legal conclusion. Given that we have already re-
jected Petitioners' arguments concerning the Board's fac-
tual findings, we must determine whether the Board's 
application of the law to those undisturbed findings "ex-
ceeds the bounds of reasonableness [**41] and rational-
ity." Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. 
App. J997) (quotations and citation omitted). 
[*P29] In relevant part, the statute governing per-
manent total disability compensation benefits provides: 
employee's permanent total 
disability. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)(i)-(iii). 
[*P30] The Board made findings relevant to each 
of these elements. With respect to the first element, the 
ALJ found n6 that "the preponderance of the evidence in 
this case established that [AlbertJ's industrial accident 
with Ameritemps on June 16, 1997[,] caused him a 4% 
whole person impairment due to his left foot injury." The 
ALJ also found that the preponderance of the evidence 
revealed that the injury Albert suffered as a result of the 
June 16, 1997 industrial accident, "with the subsequent 
four surgeries and 4% whole person permanent impair-
ment, proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the 
camel's back." Concerning the second element, the ALJ 
found that Albert "never returned to work after the June 
16, 1997 industrial accident, and thereafter by consensus 
remained permanently and totally disabled." Finally, as 
to the third element, the ALJ found that "the preponder-
ance of the evidence in this case established that [Al-
bertJ's industrial accident [***27] of June 16, 1997[,] 
acted as the direct cause of his permanent total disabil-
ity." 
n6 In its order, the Board "affirmed and 
adopted [the ALJJ's findings of fact." 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent 
total disability compensation, the em-
ployee has the burden of proof to show by 
a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained 
a significant impairment or 
combination of impair-
ments as a result of the in-
dustrial accident or occu-
pational disease that gives 
rise to the permanent total 
disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is perma-
nently totally [***26] dis-
abled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident 
or occupational disease 
was the direct cause of the 
[*P31] Based upon these undisturbed findings, the 
Board concluded that Albert was permanently totally 
disabled and that the June 16, 1997 industrial accident, 
which occurred while Albert was employed by Amer-
itemps, "was the direct cause of his permanent total dis-
ability." Accordingly, the Board entered an award of 
permanent total disability compensation benefits in favor 
of Albert and against Petitioners. Given that the Board 
made the appropriate findings to support its conclusion 
under the statute, we cannot say that its conclusion "ex-
ceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Mity 
Lite, 939 P.2d at 686 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Therefore, we affirm the Board's order denying Petition-
ers' motion for review of the ALJ's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P32] The Board's preliminary determination of 
permanent total [***28] disability is a seriatim final 
agency action, and this court does have subject matter 
jurisdiction to review it. After reviewing the Board's or-
der, we conclude that its factual findings were based 
upon substantial evidence and that its application of the 
law to those findings did not exceed the bounds of rea-
sonableness and rationality. Therefore, we affirm. 
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This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on December 12, 2005. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 45 Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted only as to the following issue: 
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